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Tribal Self-Determination at the Crossroads
KEVIN K. WASHBURN*

The tribal self-determination initiative that began
transforming federal Indian policy thirty years ago has
reached a crossroads. Despite its transformative effects on
tribal governments and the widespread belief that selfdetermination has been a successful federal approach to
Indian affairs, no significantnew self-determinationprogram
has been initiatedat the congressionallevel in several years.
This Article looks to the tribal self-determination initiative's
past to gain insights about its future. It also briefly surveys
existing tribal self-determinationprogramsand concludes that
far more work needs to be done to achieve tribal selfdetermination. Drawingon the author'sbroaderwork, it finds
one glaring gap in tribal self-determination to be the area of
tribalcriminallaw and criminaljustice.
I. INTRODUCTION

Most students of Indian law learn that American history can be divided
into several distinct "eras" of federal Indian law and policy.' While this kind
of summary analysis is necessarily contrived and ultimately somewhat
* Associate Professor, University of Minnesota Law School. The author is grateful for the work
of Matthew Krueger, Editor-in-Chief of the Minnesota Law Review, who performed an independent
research project under the author's direction, and the excellent research assistance of Lecturer Bekah
Kent at the Anglia Ruskin University in Chelmsford, England, who assisted the author while she was a
joint-degree J.D./M.P.H. student at the University of Minnesota Law School. The author especially
thanks Sam Deloria and Carole Goldberg, both of whom offered terrific insights.
1 For example, many scholars refer to the "termination era" or the "self-determination era." See
generally AMERICAN INDIAN LAW DESKBOOK (Julie Wrench & Clay Smith eds., 2d ed. 1998); WILLIAM
C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW (4th ed. 2004); ROBERT N. CLINTON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN
LAW: NATIVE NATIONS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (4th ed. 2003); COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL

INDIAN LAW (Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds., 2005 ed.) [hereinafter COHEN'S HANDBOOK]; DAVID H.
GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (4th ed. 1998); FRANCIS P. PRUCHA,
THE GREAT FATHER: THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN INDIANS (Bison 1995)

(1984); Judith V. Royster, The Legacy ofAllotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. I (1995).
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artificial, it serves as a useful shorthand for understanding the vicissitudes of
American Indian policy. Though the time periods are difficult to demarcate
with great precision, scholars tend to fix these eras by describing a particular
legislative or executive action that sets a clear direction.2
In most cases, it is far simpler to identify the beginning point of such an
era than an end point. Presidents and legislators tend to be more clear in
declaring the birth of a new policy and less so in declaring the death of an
old one. Often, the new "era" begins with a clear declaration of policy and a
flurry of new legislative initiatives. 3 After the initial flurry of activity,
momentum eventually begins to wane as specific legislative initiatives
dwindle. Eventually, enthusiasm gives way to ennui and, ultimately, a new
approach takes its place.
Take, for example, the so-called allotment/assimilation era.4 This era
is usually characterized as beginning as early as 1871, when Congress
declared its refusal to deal further with Indian tribes as separate nations
through treaties in the Appropriations Act,5 and as starting in earnest in
1887 with adoption of the General Allotment Act,6 which created a
framework for the allotment of parcels of reservation lands to individual
Indians to convert them to independent farmers.7 The end date of the era is
often characterized as 1928, when the Meriam Report was published. The
Meriam Report excoriated the allotment policies by exposing the fact that
under the policy, individual Indians tended to receive lands "of little value
for agricultural operations" and that "the better sections of the land
originally set apart for the Indians [tended to fall] into the hands of the
whites[.]" 9 It concluded that the individual allotment policy failed and
resulted in much loss of lands for Indians and Indian tribes, 10 and it
detailed numerous suggested reforms.
The Meriam Report is a useful ending point for the allotment/assimilation
era because it represented a clarion call for rejection of allotment policies as it
forecasted a radical new federal approach to Indian tribes. As a formal legal
2 See, e.g., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW DESKBOoK, supranote 1, at 13, 18.
3 Likewise, the Indian Reorganization Period (1934-1940) began with the passage of the

Wheeler-Howard Act, also known as the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-79
(1934), though it had been encouraged by the Institute for Government Research's 1928 report, The
Problem ofIndian Administration (known as the Meriam Report). INST. FOR GOV'T RESEARCH, THE
PROBLEM OF INDIAN ADMINISTRATION, at v (Johnson Reprint Corp. 1971) (1928).
4 See COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at § 1.04; PRUCHA, supra note 1, at 609.

Appropriations Act, ch. 120, 16 Stat 544 (1871) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 71 (2000)).
Allotment/Dawes Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C.
§ 331 (2000)).
See CLINTON ET AL., supra note 1, at 30-31; COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at
§ 16.03[2][b]; GETCHES ET AL., supra note 1, at 141; Robert J. Miller, Exercising Cultural SelfDetermination:The Makah Indian Tribe Goes Whaling, 25 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 165, 212 (2000-01).
6 General

8 INST. FOR GOV'T RESEARCH, supra note 3, at x.
9

1d.at 5.

'0Id.at41.
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matter, however, important aspects of the federal allotment initiative had
begun to dwindle as much as a decade or so earlier."'
Though the issuance of the Meriam Report in 1928 formally sealed the
coffin on the allotment/assimilation era, President Herbert Hoover, who2
was elected that year, made little progress on reform of Indian policy.
Informal federal action toward a new "era" in federal Indian policy began
after Roosevelt was elected in 1932 and significant legislation did not
enacted the Indian Reorganization Act
appear until 1934, when Congress
13
as part of the Indian New Deal.
As a result, the period between the early 1920s and 1932 could be
characterized as a crossroads for federal Indian policy. Allotment
initiatives had begun to wane even before the Meriam Report was
published, and yet new policies had not been formally adopted or even
formally formulated until well after its publication.
To bring this kind of analysis into the current era of federal Indian
policy, one must fast forward to the 1960s. Scholars generally agree that
the era of tribal self-determination began to form as early as the
administration of President John F. Kennedy, 14 and was formalized, at least
in the Executive Branch, with Richard Nixon's significant 1970 statement
on federal Indian policy.' 5 Shortly thereafter, Congress followed along.
The first major piece of legislation to implement the "selfdetermination" policy was Public Law 93-638, the Indian SelfDetermination Act of 1975.16 Under this law, Indian tribes could identify
federal government services that they wished to provide to their own tribal
members and contract for federal funding to provide those services
themselves. 17 Under such a contract, known as a "638 contract," a tribe
would negotiate a contract for a specific service with the Bureau of Indian
Affairs (BIA), under which the tribe would perform the federal
government's functions under specific performance standards and recordkeeping requirements imposed by law and federal regulations.' 8 Although

11Royster, supra note i, at 15 ("In 1921, the liberal policy of granting forced fee and other
premature patents was officially abandoned.
12 See

KENNETH R. PHILP, JOHN COLLIER'S CRUSADE FOR INDIAN REFORM, 1920-1954, at 92-112

(1977).

13 Indian Reorganization Act of 1934/Wheeler-Howard Act, ch. 576,48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified
as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-79 (2000)); see also PHILP, supra note 12, at 113-60.
14

See GEORGE PIERRE CASTILE, TO SHOW HEART: NATIVE AMERICAN SELF-DETERMINATION

AND FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY, 1960-1975, at 5-7 (1998); PRUCHA, supra note 1, at 1085-86.
" President Richard Nixon, Special Message on Indian Affairs (July 8, 1970), reprinted in
DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY 256-58 (Francis P. Prucha ed., 3d ed. 2000).
16 Indian Self-Determination Act, Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2206 (1975); Indian Education

Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2213 (1975) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
25 U.S.C.).
"

88 Stat. at 2206-07.

25 U.S.C. § 4501 (2000); see also Cherokee Nation of Okla. v. Leavitt, 543 U.S. 631, 646-47
(2005) (holding such contracts binding on the federal government).
IS
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neither BIA officials nor the tribes were particularly happy with the
implementation of the 638 contracts program, 19 the contracting of federal
functions on Indian reservations by Indian tribes was widely hailed as an
improvement in federal Indian policy and a meaningful step toward selfdetermination.20
Having established that tribal administration of Indian programs was
workable, the self-determination program was broadened dramatically in
1994 and recast as "self governance.'
Instead of requiring tribes to
negotiate for individual functions, the new law allowed tribes to negotiate
broad compacts with the Department of the Interior that covered virtually
all federal services on a reservation. Instead of discrete outlays for
individual programs, tribes received large block grants to address a range
of services and were given discretion as to how to allocate those federal
funds. This discretion allowed far greater flexibility and allowed tribal
governments to determine program priorities across a range of activities
and services. 22 Under the federal policies of self-determination and selfgovernance, the tribal role in implementing federal responsibilities was
broadened beyond the Department of the Interior and the Indian Health
Service (IHS), 23 to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 24 and
even the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).2 5
Today, a significant portion of the annual federal appropriation for Indian
tribal programs, including more than half of the BIA budget and nearly
19The regime was hampered by the Byzantine bureaucracy of the BIA, which compartmentalized
functions in a manner that frustrated flexibility among those providing services. Tadd M. Johnson &
James Hamilton, Self-Governancefor Indian Tribes: From Paternalismto Empowerment, 27 CONN. L.
REV. 1251, 1264-66 (1995).
20S. Bobo Dean & Joseph H. Webster, Contract Support Funding and the Federal Policy of
Indian Tribal Self-Determination,36 TULSA L. REV. 349, 350 n.6 (2000) (quoting a Miccosukee tribal
leader describing the self-determination policy "as the most successful Indian policy [ever] adopted by
the United States").
21 Indian Self-Determination Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-413, 108 Stat. 4250 ("An
Act ... to provide for tribal Self-Governance"); see also Indian Self-Determination and Education
Assistance Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-472, 102 Stat. 2285, 2296; John Tahsuda,
Economic Self-Determination: Federal Policies Promoting Development of Reservation Economies,
37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 559, 561-62 (2002).
22Johnson & Hamilton, supra note 19, at 1267-68. In 1991, seven tribes entered self-governance
compacts that constituted a total of around $27 million of federal appropriations shifted to the tribes
through funding agreements. It has since grown to involve more than 226 tribes in more than eightyfive funding agreements.
Henry M. Buffalo, Jr., Implementing Self Determination and Self
Governance 173, 174 (2003) (course materials for the 28th Annual Federal Bar Association Indian Law
Conference, Albuquerque, N.M., Apr. 10-11, 2003) (on file with the Connecticut Law Review).
23See Rose. L. Pfefferbaum et al., Providingfor the Health Care Needs of Native Americans:
Policy, Programs,Procedures,andPractices,21 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 211,223 (1997).
24See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e) (2000); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C.
§300j-1l(b)(l) (2000); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §7601(d)(2)(A) (2000); Comprehensive
Environmental Response and Liability Act ("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C. § 9626(a) (2000).
25Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act of 1996, 25 U.S.C. § 4101
(2000). NAHASDA established a single federal flexible block grant for tribes or tribally designated
housing entities to design and administer housing assistance to tribal members. See 25 U.S.C. § 4111.
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half of the IHS budget, is distributed to tribes under the self-determination
or self-governance programs.26
Although the rhetoric of self-determination remains strong on Capitol
Hill and in the Executive Branch, and there have been some modest
improvements to existing tribal programs, the last major legislative initiative
aimed at self-determination was enacted in 1996.27 No significant new
legislative initiatives have been enacted since that time.
The lack of further legislative initiatives related to self-determination is
surprising for a couple of reasons. First, the existing tribal selfdetermination initiatives are widely believed successful, 28 and it is difficult
to find criticism of them in any literature. Second, tribal political power is
perhaps stronger than ever. Third, no major piece of substantive federal
Indian legislation has been enacted in the face of significant tribal
opposition at least since the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988.29
The lack of recent initiatives may reflect that the era of tribal selfdetermination itself is now at a crossroads. Given the increasing financial
power and political access enjoyed by some tribes, it is curious that no new
legislative initiatives toward tribal self-determination have been enacted in
recent years. Has the momentum for tribal self-determination stopped?
Have all possible self-determination initiatives already been accomplished?
If not, what is the future of tribal self-determination? How can the selfdetermination policies be restarted or resuscitated?
This Article will not fully answer these important questions-indeed,
some of them can be fully answered, if at all, only in future decades once
the lens of hindsight can be brought into focus. This Article will, however,
offer some thoughts and, hopefully, some insights. This search for
understanding will focus in two key directions. First, the current status of
tribal self-determination will be measured in a brief argument that
concludes that federal policymaking has far to go before tribal selfdetermination will be fully realized. Second, on the theory that the story of
the birth of tribal self-determination programs may help illuminate the
& Webster, supra note 20, at 349-50.
was the Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act of 1996, Pub. L.

26 Dean
27 It

No. 104-330, 110 Stat. 4016 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 4101 (2000)).
28 Dean & Webster, supra note 20, at 349, 352 (noting that "the policy has been remarkably
successful" but quibbling with federal government provision of "contract support" costs); Johnson &
Hamilton, supra note 19, at 1278-79 (characterizing the Self-Governance Act as an "imperfect,
incremental step," but "a strong beginning"); Elizabeth Lohah Homer, Implementing the SelfDetermination and Self-Governance Act 177, 188 (2003) (course materials for the 28th Annual Federal
Bar Association Indian Law Conference, Albuquerque, N.M., Apr. 10-11, 2003) (on file with the
Connecticut Law Review) ("To date, there is every reason to believe that the Self-Governance process
has been extremely successful.").
29 Cf Bethany Berger, United States v. Lara as a Story of Native Agency, 40 TULSA L. REv. 5,
17-18 (2004) ("Since 1970, Congress has not passed general legislation regarding Indian tribes over
Indian opposition.").
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era's life span, lessons for the future of tribal self-determination will be
sought from its early development.
II. REALIZING SELF-DETERMINATION
One hypothesis for the lack of forward momentum in Congress toward
tribal self-determination is that full tribal self-determination has already
been achieved and no more federal legislative initiatives are needed.
Among the possible explanations, however, this one is the least likely.
Across the wide range of academic commentary on American Indian
policy, it is difficult to find any scholar who is fully satisfied with "the
actual state of things" 30 in Indian country today.
Determining whether "tribal self-determination" has been accomplished
requires a more careful consideration of what this term means.3 1 While the
rhetoric of self-determination is used widely in American Indian policy, it is
rarely defined. At a fundamental (and theoretical) level, "tribal selfdetermination" must denote the ability of an Indian tribe to "determine" its
identity, or in other words, to create its own identity through defining and
affirming its cultural values. It might also include the right of a tribe to
pursue its own destiny.32
At a more practical level, tribal self-determination might encompass
the ability of a tribe to determine its own governmental structure and
implement the .policies that will effectuate its broader tribal values. So,
how would a tribe define and communicate its values and how would it
effectuate those values in governmental structures and actions?
One of the most important ways in which sovereign political
communities define and communicate their values and implement them in
government is through criminal law. Criminal law is the formal legal
institution in which communities express important collective decisions as
30 The

"actual state of things" is a phrase Chief Justice John Marshall used in Worcester v.

Georgia, 31 U.S (6 Pet.) 515, 543 (1832), which may loosely be equated with the idea of "practical
political reality." Marshall used the phrase while trying to make legal sense of the notion that the
European nations "discovered" lands that were already occupied. Id at 543-49. Compare Robert
Laurence, Learning to Live with the PlenaryPower of Congress over the Indian Nations: An Essay in
Reaction to ProfessorWilliams' Algebra, 30 ARiz. L. REv. 413,435-37 (1988) (a sympathetic view of
Marshall's assessment of the "actual state of things"), with Robert A. Williams, Jr., Learning Not to
Live with Eurocentric Myopia: A Reply to Professor Laurence's Learning to Live with the Plenary
Power of Congress Over the Indian Nations, 30 ARIZ. L. REv. 439, 456-57 (1988) (a more hostile view
of Marshall's assessment of the "actual state of things").
31See Andrew Huff, Indigenous Land Rights and the New Self-Determination, 16 COLO. J. INT'L
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 295, 309-10 (2005) (lamenting that no law or treaty defines the term).
32 See S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 103-08 (2d ed. 2004)
(discussing the content of self-determination); see also Sabyasachi Ghoshray, Revisiting the
Challenging Landscape of Self-Determination Within the Context of Nation's Right to Sovereignty,
II ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 443, 449-50 (2005) (citing an international treaty indicating that "selfdetermination" includes a people's right "to freely determine their political status and freely pursue
their economic, social and cultural development") (internal quotations omitted).
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to what is right and what is wrong within their communities. 33 In sum, it is
where jurisdictions systematize, order and codify wrongs.
Most criminal acts involve a small number of people and the
immediate effects of the harm are borne by only a single person. We label
such an act a "crime" because this act against a single individual is
nevertheless worthy of condemnation of the entire community. 34 It is
deemed to offend the community's moral code.
Criminal law is also one of the key institutions through which the
community works to change the way the community thinks about certain
activities. 35 Through criminal law, a community can privilege some
behavioral norms and discourage others. It can do so passively through the
force of the expressive value of law, or it can do so more aggressively, by
enforcing the same law.3 6
Defining right and wrong is simply one of the most important things
that governments do. Indeed, with the possible exception of education, it
is difficult to think of another formal institution that is as important in
defining, reinforcing and thus preserving community values.
Criminal law is the institution in which communities set out their most
important values about how people should treat one another. (Criminal
procedure is important, too-it is the legal institution in which
communities develop and set out their values as to how the state should
treat people in circumstances in which criminal laws may apply.) By
formally institutionalizing community values in the criminal laws,
communities preserve and reinforce those values.
One need only look at substantive provisions in state criminal codes to
understand the power of this fundamental truth. Consider that in Texas, a
person is privileged to kill a thief to prevent the thief from successfully
absconding with personal property.3 7 In contrast, in California and in
many other states, one may never use deadly force to defend mere property
and may use such force only to prevent grave physical harm or death to a
person.38 These laws express far more than their respective communities'
33 See Erik Luna, Principled Enforcement of Penal Codes, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 515, 537
(2000) ("Law expresses the values and expectations of society; it makes a statement about what is good
or bad, right or wrong."); see also EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 80-81

(George
34 Simpson trans., Free Press 1933) (1893).
Henry Hart, The Aims of CriminalLaw, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401,405 (1958).
35 See Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REv. 349,
362-63 (1997) (criminal law is simply a tool for the regulation of community norms and through
regulating norms it can change behavior).
36See id at 363.
37 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 9.41-.42 (2003) (generally allowing one to use force to protect
one's property and even allowing the use of deadly force against a burglar, robber, or nighttime thief
during flight if one reasonably believes that the property cannot be recovered any other way).
38 E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:3-6 (2005); People v. Ceballos, 536 P.2d 241, 246 (Cal. 1974); see
also JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 261 (3d ed. 2001); WAYNE R. LAFAVE,
CRIMINAL LAW 553 (4th ed. 2003).
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views about crime; they constitute key expressions of the relative value of
property and human life in those communities. By codifying those values
in the criminal laws, these communities thereby internally reinforce these
important value judgments.
All criminal laws express value judgments of one kind or another. The
development of criminal laws is vital in helping communities define
themselves. Not only is the definition of criminal law important at the
outset, but the everyday application of criminal law through the courts
reinforces the existing value structure in a very formal and concrete
manner. It also contributes to the broader informal conversation within the
community about those values. In sum, the activities of defining right and
wrong in a criminal code are bound up in a fundamental way with selfdetermination. In that respect, criminal laws are perhaps the most
important community expressions of social norms and community values.
They are thus fundamental to community identity and self-determination.
Now consider Indian tribes. Indian tribes have been largely preempted
from discussing, defining and reinforcing their important values in this
manner because felonies on Indian reservations are not defined by Indian
tribes. 39 Felonies on Indian reservations are defined by Congress and, to a
lesser extent, state legislatures. 40 In fact, Congress has prohibited Indian
tribes from defining felony offenses.4' Indian tribes are thus shut out of
this key aspect of self-determination in two important ways. First, a tribe
is formally denied the power to determine right and wrong for itself.
Second, the value judgments of another community are imposed upon the
tribe, and indeed, imposed forcibly; these outside norms are violable only
on pain of incarceration. While the former denies the tribe the ability to
determine its own identity, the latter forces tribal members to adopt an
identity defined by outsiders.
To be sure, Indian tribes do have the power to define and prosecute
misdemeanors. 42 But because of the very nature of limitation to misdemeanors, a tribe cannot address issues of great importance except in very
limited and perhaps symbolic ways. Tribes also have a very limited power
of self-determination as to certain provisions in federal law. Consider, for
example, the death penalty. The Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994
provides that the federal death penalty will apply to crimes arising on
39 See generally Kevin K. Washburn, Federal Criminal Law and Tribal Self-Determination,
84 N.C. L. REv. 779 (2006).
40Felonies between tribal members are largely defined by Congress under the Major Crimes Act,
18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2000). Felonies involving tribal members and others are defined under the Major
Crimes Act, the Indian Country Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2000), under general federal laws, or by
substantive state law by assimilation under the Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13 (2000).
"' The Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (2000), prohibits Indian tribes from levying
sentences greater than one year in prison or fines in excess of $5000.
42See 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7).
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Indian reservations under the federal Indian country criminal statutes only
if the relevant Indian tribe chooses the death penalty and recognizes federal
authority to pursue capital sentences.4 3
In recent years, serious offenses on the Navajo Reservation have led to
extensive debate within the tribe about whether the Navajo Nation should
opt in to the federal death penalty. 44 In that debate, the Navajo Nation's
vice president asserted that the death penalty "goes against everything
Navajos stand for" while the Navajo Nation's president supported the
death penalty for heinous offenses, such as the triple murder that ignited
the most recent debate. 45
The Navajo federal death penalty debate demonstrates that
fundamental public safety issues are exceedingly important on Indian
reservations, just as they are important everywhere else. Because of
Congress's adoption of the tribal option for the federal death penalty, these
debates can now occur, but the debate is necessarily limited by the fact that
opting in to the federal death penalty requires a tribe to place the lives of
its members in the hands of another sovereign. This places a substantial
limitation on the debate.
In many other areas, Congress has recognized tribal governmental
authority to set normative standards, even where that authority affected nonIndians. For example, Congress has delegated authority to Indian tribes 46 or
recognized inherent tribal authority to set certain substantive standards in the
environmental context, such as air and water quality standards.Y For some
tribes, these environmental issues can be exceedingly important to tribal
culture.48 Setting such standards allows a tribe to obtain an environmental
standard that is higher than the federal baseline and thus allows a tribe to
marginally improve reservation environmental quality over state or federal
standards. While environmental standards are sometimes important, they
generally do not go directly to the heart of community identity in the
fundamental way that criminal laws do.
Thus, while it is widely agreed that the last thirty-five years have
43 Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-332, Title VI, § 60002(a), 108 Stat. 1968
(specific provision codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3598 (2000)).
4E.g., Ryan Hall, Navajo Nation Officials Split on Use of Death Penalty; President Shirley Says
He Supports Death Sentence for 'Heinous' Crimes, DAILY TIMES, Dec. 4, 2005, available at http://
www.daily-times.com/apps/pbes.dll/article?AID=-/20051204/NEWSOI/512040303/1001; Jim Maniaci,
Hearings Set for Navajo Stand on Death Penalty, GALLUP INDEP., Sept. 10, 2003, available at http://
web.archive.org/web/20040312202727/www.gallupindependent.com/09-10-03navajostandondeath.html;
Mark Shaffer, TrialNears Endfor Mom Accused of Killing Three Kids, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Jan. 16, 2003, at
5B; Dennis Wagner, Killer Gets Death in Navajo CarijackCase, ARIz. REPUBLIC, May 21,2003, at 8B.
45 Hall, supra note 44.
46 See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 760 1(d) (2000).
41See 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d); see also Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1370, 1377 (2000).
48 See City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415, 428-29 (10th Cir. 1996) (upholding tribal
water quality standards that preserve the Pueblo of Isleta's ability to use water in the Rio Grande for
ceremonial purposes).
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constituted "the era of tribal self-determination," real self-determination
has not been-and cannot be-achieved until tribes can determine for
themselves what is right and what is wrong on their own reservations and
in human transactions involving their own members. If tribes are to
achieve any real measure of self-determination, they must have the power
to enact substantive criminal laws. In the absence of this power, Indian
people must conform their actions to rules and value judgments imposed
on them by outsiders. Such a scheme is a tremendous obstacle to true selfdetermination.
The high-stakes nature of this argument may offer some insight into
the lack of further progress toward tribal self-determination on the
congressional front in the last decade. Most of the self-determination
initiatives of the last thirty-five years primarily involved shifting
appropriated federal monies and federal responsibilities from federal
agencies to tribal governmental agencies. 9 Such programs reduced
administrative burdens at the federal level. While these efforts have been
enormously positive, these initiatives were, to some degree, low-hanging
fruit that was easily plucked from the tree.
That is not to say that they were not important. Given the poverty on
many Indian reservations, decisions on where and how to use federal
appropriations are exceedingly important. But while tribal governments
now exercise greater day-to-day control in using these funds, the federal
government retains the ability and indeed the responsibility to supervise
tribal activities.50 Ultimate control remains within the federal government.
In that sense, the existing tribal self-determination initiatives thus far have
been relatively modest efforts that do not disrupt the allocation of power
between the federal government and the tribes.
To advance tribal self-determination further may require tribal leaders
and federal policy makers to reach much higher. Increasing meaningful
tribal self-determination almost necessarily requires restoring a greater
measure of tribal autonomy and reducing federal control on Indian
reservations. In sum, furthering self-determination in this manner involves
trusting tribes to take responsibility over matters that will have tremendous
impact on the lives of Indian defendants and Indian victims. How could it
be possible for Indian tribes to increase tribal autonomy in such a highstakes manner and in such exceedingly important matters as substantive
criminal law? One insight might be gleaned from the early days of the era
of tribal self-determination.
49 Homer, supra note 28, at 187 (describing an "annual trust evaluation" of the tribe's implementation of trust programs and providing for "[s]ecretarial reassumption of trust programs" from the tribe).
0
Id. at 184.
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III. THE BIRTH OF THE CURRENT ERA
OF TRIBAL SELF-DETERMINATION

The federal policy favoring "self-determination" is taken for granted by
many American Indians today because it is the only policy most tribal
citizens have ever known. 51 Given the now-obvious normative force of the
argument for tribal self-determination, some might assume that the current
era in federal policy came about because enlightened federal policymakers in
Congress and the BIA finally gave in to the exhortations of tribal leaders and
gradually loosened the reins of federal control over Indian reservations. The
truth, however, is much more complicated. The self-determination era in
Indian policy really began not as an independent policy initiative related to
American Indians, but as a component of a much broader national initiative.
And this particular truth offers some exceedingly important insights into the
development of federal Indian policy.
In some respects, tribal self-determination as an affirmative federal
policy began in the 1930s during the New Deal era under the legal auspices
of the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA). 2 The IRA preserved, empowered
and transformed modem tribal governments, but it did not assist them to
become particularly sophisticated governing institutions and it made only
modest efforts at increasing tribal self-governance. 53 The real value of the
IRA was that it recognized the continuing legal status of tribal
governments and thus helped to hold back the forces that wished to sweep
American Indians into the great American melting pot.54 To the extent that
tribal governments retain some of their authority through the grace of the
federal government,5 5 the IRA is less significant to tribes today.56
The vitality and sophistication of tribal governments today stems to a
51More than one-third of American Indians were under the age of 18 at the time of the 2000
Census. Cynthia A. Brewer & Trudy A. Suchan, MAPPING CENSUS 2000: THE GEOGRAPHY OF U.S.
DIVERSITY 48 (2001).

52See Indian Reorganization Act of 1934/Wheeler-Howard Act, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (1934)
(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-79 (2000)) (statutes enacted in 1930s for the protection of
Indians and conservation of resources); see also CASTILE, supra note 14, at 11-18 (discussing how
Indian relations were altered during the time of the New Deal); PHILP, supra note 12, at 26-54;
FRANCIS P. PRUCHA, 2 THE GREAT FATHER: THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN
INDIANS, 1115-20 (1984).
53See CASTILE, supra note 14, at xviii-xix (surveying the varying views of historians as to the
effectiveness of the IRA).

'4 See id. at xix ("[W]ithout the IRA there would have been no federally acknowledged Indian
governments in place to resist the resurgence of assimilation that shortly followed.").
55To be clear, the primary force behind the persistence of tribal governments is the resilience of
Indian people themselves, not the varied, inconsistent and flawed federal policies that have existed

these past two centuries.
56Indeed, because many tribal constitutions adopted pursuant to the IRA require secretarial
approval for amendment, the IRA serves as a drag on tribal self-determination. See COHEN'S
HANDBOOK, supranote 1, at § 4.04[3][a][i].
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much greater extent from the self-determination policies that have developed
in the last three decades from the policies implemented in the IRA. It is
these more recent initiatives that transformed Indian self-government and
earned this period of Indian policy the title "era of tribal self-determination."
This era was originally not about tribal self-determination, though.
Congress originally had a different and much broader target.
Early in his presidency in 1964, Lyndon B. Johnson declared
"unconditional war on poverty in America.",57 President Johnson proposed
a broad social initiative that culminated in substantial new legislation and
the creation of a new federal office, the Office of Economic Opportunity
(OEO), which was located directly within the Executive Office of the
President.58
The War on Poverty was a bold initiative and a signature policy for
President Johnson. It embodied far more than appropriations; it also
involved substantive control. The policymakers who worked under the
auspices of the OEO in the White House attempted an innovative approach
to the problem of poverty that avoided elitism and embraced grassroots
community organizations. 59 Key federal policymakers believed that local
governments were part of the problem of poverty, not part of the solution.
Yet, these policymakers were hopeful about the promise of grassroots
community organizers. The program that developed came to reflect a
cynical view of past public efforts to address the problem of poverty and
skeptical view of local governments. At its core, the OEO's philosophy
reflected a progressive mindset that the poor should be centrally involved
in addressing the problem of poverty.6 °
The centerpiece of the OEO's antipoverty initiative was the
community action program, which Congress charged with developing
antipoverty programs at the local level. These initiatives were to be
developed with public or nonprofit "community action" agencies that were
to be operated "with the maximum feasible participation of residents of the
areas and members of the groups served[.]",61 The federal legislation
37

President Lyndon B. Johnson, Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union

(Jan. 8, 1964), in 1 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: LYNDON B. JOHNSON

114 (1965).
58 Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-452, 78 Stat. 508, Title VI (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 2941 (2000)).
59 ALLEN J. MATUSOW, THE UNRAVELING OF AMERICA: A HISTORY OF LIBERALISM IN THE

1960s, at 116-24 (1984).
60 See id. at 116-19 (discussing programs which involved people from poor communities); JAMES
A. MORONE, THE DEMOCRATIC WISH 21317 (rev. ed. 1998); Sanford Kravitz, The Community Action
Program-Past,Present, andIts Future?, in 2 ON FIGHTING POVERTY 52, 54-59 (James L. Sundquist
ed., 1969) (discussing the emergence of new community agencies and the impact of these programs on
the poor community).
6' Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 § 202(a)(3), Pub. L. No. 88-452, 78 Stat. 508 (1964). For a
critical history, see generally DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, MAXIMUM FEASIBLE MISUNDERSTANDING
(1969) (discussing "maximum feasible participation" as it relates to the Economic Opportunity Act).
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containing these requirements left tremendous discretion with the OEO to
define the substantive meanings of these instructions.6 2 Given their
prejudices against local governments, the OEO officials who implemented
the law generally sought to bypass state and local governments and work
directly with community groups.6 3
Though the War on Poverty seemed primarily directed at the urban
poor, Indian tribes and their representatives actively lobbied Congress
when it considered the Economic Opportunity Act, seeking to be included
in the Act's antipoverty provisions. 64 While the Act was pending in
Congress, senators and House members exacted promises from the
Administration that tribes would be allowed to participate. 65 Thus, the
broader goals of the War on Poverty came to Indian country.
Though the OEO's decision to fund tribal governments was certainly
beneficial in financial terms, it was far more powerful in another respect. In
the words of commentator Sam Deloria, the OEO's "decision to fund tribes
directly, bypassing the Bureau, implicitly recognized the Bureau's historic
role as the de facto municipal government of Indian reservations., 66 Within
the federal government, tribal governments were thus treated more like
grassroots community action organizations. Consistent with the more
mainstream OEO policy of mistrust toward municipal governments, the
grassroots tribal governments were thought to be better suited than the BIA
regime to assist members of reservation communities.6 7
Though tribal governments had difficulty establishing community action
programs in the earliest days of the OEO, tribes eventually became
successful in obtaining OEO grants. 68 From 1965 to 1967, community
action program grants to Indian tribes increased from $3.6 million to
$20.1 million.69
62 James

at 6, 29.
63

L. Sundquist, Originsof the War on Poverty, inON FIGHTING POVERTY, supra note 60,

Philip S. Deloria, The Era of Indian Self-Determination: An Overview, in INDIAN SELF-RULE

191, 197 (Kenneth R. Philp ed., 1986).
64See Daniel M. Cobb, Philosophy of an Indian War: Indian Community Action in the Johnson
Administration's War on Indian Poverty, 1964-1968, 22 AM. INDIAN CULTURE & RES. J. 71 (1998)
(providing an in-depth discussion of the "maximum feasible participation" philosophy and its relation
to tribal self-determination).
65 See Economic Opportunity Act of 1964: Hearings on H.R 10440 Before the Subcomm.
on the War
on Poverty Program of the H. Comm. on Education & Labor, 88th Cong. 366 (1964) (statement of Stewart
Udall, Secretary of the Interior) (affirming that Indians would be eligible for all OEO programs and that
the President Johnson "want[ed] the Indians in the forefront"); Economic Opportunity Act of 1964:
Hearings on S. 2642 Before the Senate Select Comm. on Poverty of the Comm. on Labor & Public
Welfare, 88th Cong. 137-40 (1964) (statement of Sargent Shriver) (promising that the OEO could send
community action funds directly to tribal governments, bypassing municipal and state governments).
66Deloria, supra note 63, at 197.
67 See id.
68 E.g.,
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69
Id. at 124.
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Meanwhile, the OEO's general bias in favor of community groups and
antipathy toward municipal governments began to anger state and local
officials, causing them to lobby for greater local government control over
community action programs.7 ° In 1968, Congress acted on the concerns of
state and local officials by amending the Economic Opportunity Act to
require community action agencies to operate under the aegis of state or
local governments and gave state and local officials much greater
management control. 7' By this time, however, Indian tribes were part of
the fabric of the OEO programs. To preserve the key role of tribal
governments, tribes successfully lobbied to insure that the amendments
made tribal governments equivalent to state or local governments 72for
purposes of obtaining-and participating in--community action grants.
In that sense, Indian tribes accomplished a very successful act of shape
shifting during this period. When local governments were thought to be
obstacles to antipoverty programs,73 tribes portrayed themselves as grassroots
organizations. Because OEO policymakers seemed to view Indian tribes as
de facto local community groups that were "governments" in formal terms
only, they were willing to adopt this fiction and work with tribes. Three years
later, when tribes needed to be considered legitimate governments to retain
direct access to OEO grants, Congress was willing to treat them as such. The
OEO legislation foreshadowed important future legislative efforts in treating
tribes like state and local governments for a wide range of substantive policy
areas, most notably in the environmental arena. 4
Thus one important insight from the birth of the tribal selfdetermination movement is this: Tribes were successful in achieving public
policy objectives in the 1960s by downplaying their governmental status
and emphasizing the BIA's dominant role on Indian reservations, thereby
successfully tapping into official cynicism about the effectiveness of
governments as instruments of change. 75 At the time, tribal governments
70

See FRANCES Fox PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR 271 (1971)

(discussing the desire of local politicians to gain more control over the community action programs).
71 An amendment to the Economic Opportunity Act, sponsored by Rep. Edith Green (D. Ore.) in
1967 and thereafter known as the Green Amendment, required the community action agencies to
operate under control of state or local governments. H.R. REP. No. 90-1012 (1967) (Conf. Rep.),
reprintedin 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2578-80.
72See, e.g., Economic Opportunity Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-222, § 212, 81 Stat. 672
(1967); H.R. REP. NO. 90-866 (1967), reprintedin 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2428, 2449-50 (recognizing, for
example, that a "requirement that one-third of each community action board by public officials is
satisfied ... by membership of officials of the tribe").
73See Deloria, supra note 63, at 197 (discussing the efforts to bypass city governments).
74Two examples are the environmental statutes and the historic preservation statutes. See, e.g.,
National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 470a(d)(2) (2000) (allowing tribes to assume the
functions of state historic preservation officials in certain circumstances); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 13 77(e) (2000) (authorizing the treatment of Indian tribes as states for the purposes of environmental
programs); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d)(1XA) (2000) (same).
75See supranotes 59-60.
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were rhetorically flexible enough to be able to distance themselves from
state and local governments. The strategy was to de-emphasize the
governmental status of tribes and to present themselves as grassroots
community organizations living under the thumb of a local BIA
superintendent who was ill-equipped and unmotivated to address the
problem of reservation poverty.
Tribes pursued the more formal status of "governments" only when
they needed it to remain eligible for the OEO programs. 6 As a practical
matter, the early OEO grants did not have the effect of helping tribes
formalize their governmental leadership and provided modest resources for
governing. When the time to be considered local governments came,
because of the early assistance from the OEO, they were able to act more
like governments.
If tribes had been unwilling to compromise their status-if they had,
for example, aggressively asserted their sovereign status at the outsetthen they might not have achieved successes with the 0EO. Militant and
inflexible assertions of tribal sovereignty may be emotionally satisfying,
and they may, frankly, be more consistent with fundamental notions of
truth and justice. But strong expressions of "sovereignty" seem to come up
hollow in so many Supreme Court cases 77 at a time when even mild and
well-founded legal assertions of tribal sovereignty seem to produce judicial
divestiture of sovereignty.78 Indeed, a flexible and more practical approach
may sometimes be useful as long as Congress yields plenary power and the
Court wields the doctrine of implicit divestiture.7 9
Another important insight from the birth of tribal self-determination
lies in the fact that, as Indian policy, tribal self-determination developed
accidentally and in spite of official federal Indian policy, not because of it.
The War on Poverty was not an "Indian program" and neither the
Department of the Interior nor the BIA participated in drafting the
legislation. 0
Despite the fact that it was not an Indian program, the inclusion of
76

See, e.g., Deloria, supra note 63, at 200 ("[T]he role of tribes as relatively permanent

governments ... was strengthened by the use of governments as the local delivery system for the
programs designed to implement the nation's concern for poverty .... "); Alfonso Ortiz et al., The War
on Poverty, in INDIAN SELF-RULE, supra note 63, at 219, 219 ("Initially, Oklahoma was not eligible for
OEO funds, because the state did not have Indian reservations.").
77See David H. Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist's Court s PursuitofStates' Rights,
Color-Blind Justice and Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L. REV. 267, 267-69, 278-85 (2001) (noting
that Indian tribes have had little success in recent Supreme Court cases).
'$ See City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 544 U.S.
, 125 S. Ct. 1478, 1489-93
(2005) (holding that the tribe, even by purchasing land that had been illegally alienated from it, could
not successfully restore its aboriginal title to the land).
79See id.

goSee CLARKIN, supra note 68, at 111.
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tribes in the OEO programs had dramatic ramifications for American
Indian policy. The OEO's community action grants enabled Indian tribes
to become governments in a much more meaningful sense than beforethey now had an alternative financial source that would work to help them
accomplish governmental purposes by themselves and independent of the
BIA. This alternative funding stream to tribes ultimately broke the BIA's
chokehold on policymaking on Indian reservations 8 ' and allowed tribal
governments to come into their own as governments. Through the War on
Poverty, the OEO simultaneously made the BIA less relevant on Indian
reservations and empowered tribal
governments to work toward goals that
82
the BIA had never accomplished.
The irony is that though the War on Poverty failed to end poverty, it
dramatically affected future federal Indian policy. This broader social
initiative may have had more positive effects for Indian tribes than any
federal "Indian policy" initiative has ever had. Indeed, to a significant
extent, modem tribal governments were born from the War on Poverty
programs.8 3 With OEO support, tribes became more politically organized,
more sophisticated, and better able to demand that the BIA itself find ways
to adopt self-determination policies. And, in the OEO, the tribes suddenly
had advocates in the White House who agreed with such approaches.
Tribes eventually obtained the right to contract federal services to be
provided by tribes themselves through 638 contracts and self-governance
compacts.84 As a result, tribal governments developed in an extraordinary
fashion and Indian reservations are very different places today than they
were in the 1960s. Today, on many Indian reservations, tribal governments
are the primary providers of all government services.85
While the War on Poverty was indeed animated by a notion of selfdetermination, it was not a notion of tribal self-determination or selfdetermination for indigenous peoples. Rather, it reflected a much broader
principle of human, citizen or community self-determination. It reflected
the notion that the poor are likely to have significant insight into the
problems of poverty and may be best motivated to find the solutions. 86 It
recognized that paternalism to the poor was anachronistic and that the poor
should be empowered to address the problems which they felt most keenly.
SI See Cobb, supra note 64, at 75.
82

Cf Deloria, supra note 63, at 196-98 (indicating that while the OEO may have made the BIA

less relevant to Indian reservations, the BIA remains "an old-line established agency").
83 See Cobb, supra note 64, at 85, 91-92 (noting that the community action program "breathed
life into tribal governments" and helped develop a generation of tribal leaders with political skills and
federal bureaucratic savvy).
4 See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
85 See, e.g., Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C.. §§ 450-450b,
450f (2000) (allowing tribes to contract with the Bureau of Indian Affairs to administer BIA programs
using federal funding).
6 See Legal Services and the War on Poverty, 13 CATH. LAW. 272, 277 (1967).
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In that respect, self-determination reflected a very generalized principle of
good government; that is, that constituents ought to be placed in the key
roles in devising solutions to the problems that affect them.
Thus conceived, the notion of self-determination that now animates
federal Indian policy was not indigenous to American Indians. And it was
not invented as an Indian policy. American Indians did not invent the
concept and it was not adopted in Indian country because of the power of
American Indian rhetoric or even the moral force of addressing the
injustice committed against American Indians. Self-determination first
came to Indian country as a by-product of a general public policy.
Moreover, it was years after the War on Poverty that American Indian
nations became involved in international efforts to further selfdetermination for indigenous peoples.
One important lesson here is that, despite the rhetoric of selfdetermination, Indian tribes do not drive federal Indian policy. Much larger
and wider considerations tend to drive federal policy. In the 1960s, the War
on Poverty was a significant federal policy initiative, figuratively a fastmoving freight train, with the highest levels of political support. Indeed, it
was ultimately one of the most important federal policies of that decade;
many of its successful programs are still alive today. 87 Tribal leaders were
able to hop aboard the War on Poverty freight train and ride that initiative
successfully to a better political place for Indian tribes. But tribes and tribal
leaders were not the engineers; they were merely along for the ride. 8
Thus, the key question for tribal advocates is: How can Indian tribes
identify and climb aboard the public policy initiatives today that are
equivalent to the War on Poverty and ride those new initiatives toward real
self-determination for tribal governments?
IV. HOPPING ABOARD A MOVING TRAIN

If self-determination came to Indian tribes only because the larger
body politic was interested in self-determination for the poor, then the goal
for current tribal advocates ought to be to find other broad policy initiatives
in American government that can also benefit Indian tribes. When
President Johnson declared war on poverty, tribal governments essentially
volunteered as foot soldiers in that war, even downplaying their
governmental authority and presenting themselves as community
organizations so that they could meet the enlistment qualifications.
Such an approach is not unique to Indian policy. Joining broader
87 Examples are the Head Start program, legal services, and Upward Bound. See generally SAR

A. LEVITAN, THE GREAT SOCIETY'S POOR LAW 133-89 (1969) (discussing these and other programs).
88Tribal leaders and advocates do deserve credit for pushing policymakers to include tribes in the
initiative.
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initiatives is a good way for a politically small group to change national
policy in its favor.89 Tribal advocates must be innovative. Tribes joined a
broader national initiative in the 1960s and it was largely responsible for
bringing us the modem notion of tribal self-determination" in which tribal
governments provide services to tribal citizens. Indian tribes are very
small and lack the financial resources and the constituencies that create
significant power in the political realm. Tribes do not set national agendas.
Indeed, tribes cannot create the freight trains that move federal policy. The
challenge to tribal leaders is to try to gain tribes berths as passengers on
those trains and, at the same time, to avoid being hit by these trains.
If tribal self-determination has stalled out and the question is how to
resume forward momentum, the answer is to find a useful federal initiative
that Indian tribes can climb aboard. Today is a different time than the 1960s.
In many respects, it is a darker and less idealistic time. The United States no
longer wages the War on Poverty. 9' While a few successful poverty
89As Professor William Eskridge, Jr., has explained, African Americans, women, gays, and other

social movements achieved progressive change in American policy using such strategies. See
generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects ofIdentity-BasedSocial Movements on Constitutional
Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062 (2002) (describing how lawyers helped to
further the interests of women and minorities by translating their problems and aspirations into a
broader constitutional discourse); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Channeling: Identity-Based Social
Movements and Public Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 419 (2001) (describing how the civil rights and
women's liberation movements helped to formulate the modem meaning of the Equal Protection
Clause); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Destabilizing Due Process and Evolutive Equal Protection,
47 UCLA L. REV. 1183 (2000) (arguing against the thesis that the Equal Protection Clause is always
forward-looking, but rather that it can often defer to past practices; also arguing that the Equal
Protection Clause can potentially offer minorities wholesale level protections once the courts recognize
their legitimacy as "partners in American pluralist democracy"). In briefing Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558, 562, 578-79 (2003), Eskridge forwarded the gay rights movement by tying the case to a
libertarian agenda. And Eskridge's theory was successful, ultimately co-opting a conservative Court in
an argument that convinced the swing vote, Justice Kennedy, to write an opinion striking down a Texas
law as unconstitutional.
In a new work, Eskridge is attempting to take the gay rights movement further. William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Three Lessons After Thirty-Five Years of the Same-Sex MarriageDebate, 91 MINN. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2006) (presented as the annual Lockhart Lecture at the University of Minnesota). In
this new work, Eskridge explains that it is not gays, but straight couples who present the real threat to
traditional marriage, by legalizing cohabitation, sex outside of marriage and promoting legal reforms
such as no-fault divorce laws that have undermined the norm of marriage as a mandatory lifetime
commitment. Eskridge argues that advocates of traditional marriage ought to be decrying these
"reforms," not crusading against gays who are alarmed at the devaluation of the institution of marriage.
Because many in the gay marriage movement are committed to many of the traditional elements of
marriage, Eskridge implies that traditional family values conservatives should embrace gay marriage.
Eskridge's reasoning is clever and suggests that he is not content at co-opting the conservative
libertarians, but is now setting his sights on the religious right. In short, Eskridge successfully secured
gays a seat on the privacy/libertarian bandwagon, and is now trying to sneak them aboard the "family
values" freight train that has rumbled along with tremendous inertia during the last decade. Eskridge's
example is an important lesson about how marginal political movements like the gay rights movement
can leverage their power.
90See CASTILE, supra note 14, at 24, 68-69.
9' The War on Poverty slowly died from political stalemate and budget problems. See ROBERT F.
CLARK, THE WAR ON POVERTY, 265-70 (2002) (describing how funds for American Indian programs
were large after initial passage of the War on Poverty legislation, and how these funds have
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programs live on, many of them have been cut dramatically. 92 But the last
fifteen to twenty years have brought
93 several other "wars," including a "War
on Crime" and a "War on Terror."
Though these new policy initiatives are characterized far more by
cynicism than idealism, the playbook for Indian tribes could be very
similar. Just as Indian tribes were effective soldiers in the War on Poverty
and their participation paid great dividends (other than poverty reduction)
for tribes,94 Indian tribes may be able to present themselves as foot soldiers
in the War on Crime and the War on Terror.
One way for tribes to be a part of the federal effort against crime and to
simultaneously promote tribal self-determination is to promote more
respect for existing tribal institutions of criminal justice and to present
themselves as partners in achieving public safety and criminal justice on
Indian reservations. A potential reform at the federal level is federal
recognition of tribal court convictions in federal sentencing. 95
Such an approach may pay dividends beyond criminal law. On the
civil side, tribal courts have been taking a beating in recent years at the
federal level. The Supreme Court's decisions in Iowa Mutua 96 and
National Farmers Union,97 decided at the height of tribal selfdetermination initiatives, evinced tremendous respect for tribal judicial
systems, but their promise has been limited in more recent cases. 98 If
federal judges in the federal sentencing context are instructed to respect
routine criminal convictions from tribal courts, federal courts are much
subsequently dried up in recent years); JAMES T. PATTERSON, AMERICA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST
POVERTY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 193-94, 196-97, 200-03 (2000) (discussing how budgetary
issues contributed to the problems of implementing the War on Poverty programs).
92For example, President Clinton's welfare reform legislation changed many of the social goals
of the War on Poverty. See Welfare Reform Extension Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-210, 118 Stat.
564 (2004); Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-193,
110 Stat. 2105 (1996).
93
See MICHAEL KATZ, THE UNDESERVING POOR: FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE WAR ON

WELFARE 137-38, 140-41, 195-97 (1989) (attributing the failure of the War on Poverty to the growth
of the conservative movement led by President Reagan in the 1980s and the rising costs associated with
its various programs).
94See CASTILE, supra note 14, at 26-33.

95Kevin K. Washburn, Tribal Courts and Federal Sentencing, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 403, 450 (2004).
96 Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987) (requiring exhaustion of tribal court
review to federal diversity cases before they can be heard in federal court).
97Nat'l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. of Indians v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845 (1985) (requiring
exhaustion of tribal court review of the federal question of tribal jurisdiction before allowing cases to
be heard in federal courts).
98See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001) (holding that tribal courts lack jurisdiction to hear
tort claims arising from a state police officer's execution of a state search warrant on reservation land
relating to an off-reservation crime); Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001) (holding
that tribes do not have the authority to tax nonmember activity that occurs on non-Indian land within a
reservation); Strate v. A-I Contractors, 250 U.S. 438, 442, 453 (1997) (holding that tribal courts may
not hear tort claims against nonmembers "arising out of accidents on state highways, absent a statute or
treaty authorizing the tribe to govern the conduct of nonmembers on the highway in question," and
stating that "a tribe's adjudicative jurisdiction does not exceed its legislative jurisdiction").
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more likely to develop a deeper appreciation of tribal courts and of tribes
as governments. The habitual acceptance by federal courts of tribal
convictions might help federal courts to see tribal courts as sisters and
might work implicitly to facilitate federal acceptance of tribal civil
judgments.
The strategy suggested here is not novel. In 1986, tribes effectively
joined the War on Drugs and succeeded in increasing their criminal
jurisdictional limitations from six months of imprisonment to one year of
imprisonment, or effectively from petty to gross misdemeanor authority. 99
That reform came in omnibus anti-drug legislation and was expressed by
Congress as an effort to "enhance the ability of tribal governments to
prevent and penalize the traffic of illegal narcotics in Indian
reservations[.]"' 0 0 Likewise, the success in creating the block-grant style
approach in the "tribal self governance" initiatives in 1994 was no doubt
assisted by the focus on "devolution" of federal social welfare programs to
states in the 1980s and early 1990s. 1 1 Finally, similar instincts have been
apparent in recent years in the War on Terror, animating an attempt to
secure a role for Indian tribes in the new homeland security efforts. 102
V. CONCLUSION
In a long history of federal Indian policy that has swung like a pendulum
toward and then against federal support for Indian tribes, tribal governments
may be at the crossroads of a new policy era. If tribes want federal efforts
toward tribal self-determination to expand rather than contract, tribes must
find ways to breathe new life into this important policy. Because the
absence of self-determination in the area of criminal justice may
fundamentally represent the absence of any real self-determination for Indian
tribes, criminal justice is an obvious place to begin.

9 See Act of Oct. 26, 1986 Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C.
§ 1302(7) (2000)).
'00100 Stat. 3207.
101See Indian Self-Determination Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-413, 108 Stat. 4250 (1994); see
also Harry N. Scheiber, Redesigning the Architecture of Federalism-AnAmerican Tradition: Modern
Devolution Policies in Perspective, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 227 (1996) (describing the Reagan and
Gingrich policies of devolution).
102 Exec. Order No. 13228, 66 Fed. Reg. 51812 (Oct. 8, 2001). See generally National
Native
American Law Enforcement Association, Tribal Homelands Security Report (July 2004), http://www.
nnalea.org/hlsecurity/NNALEAForumFinal-Final.pdf (describing how federal agencies and tribal
governments are most responsible for preventing a terrorist attack on reservation land, since state
governments have limited jurisdiction on sovereign tribal lands).

